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The Federal Reserve's Catch-22:1 A Legal Analysis of the Federal
Reserve's Emergency Powers
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government's role in the buyout of The Bear
Stearns Companies (Bear) by JPMorgan Chase (JPMorgan) will
be of lasting significance because it shaped a pivotal moment in the
most threatening financial crisis since The Great Depression.2 On
March 13, 2008, Bear informed "the Federal Reserve and other
government agencies that its liquidity position had significantly
deteriorated, and it would have to file for bankruptcy the next day
unless alternative sources of funds became available., 3  The
potential impact of Bear's insolvency to the global financial
system4 persuaded officials at the Federal Reserve (the Fed) and
the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to take
unprecedented regulatory action.5 The response immediately
1. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (Laurel 1989).
2. See Turmoil in the Financial Markets: Testimony Before the H. Oversight and
Government Reform Comm., 1 10"h Cong. -- (2008) [hereinafter Greenspan Testimony]
(statement of Dr. Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve Board of
Governors) ("We are in the midst of a once-in-a century credit tsunami."); Niall
Ferguson, Wall Street Lays Another Egg, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2008, at 190, available at
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/12/banks200812 ("[B]eginning in the
summer of 2007, [the global economy] began to self-destruct in what the
International Monetary Fund soon acknowledged to be 'the largest financial shock
since the Great Depression."'); Jeff Zeleny and Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Warns
of Prospect for Trillion-Dollar Deficits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at Al ("When the
American people spoke last November, they were demanding change - change in
policies that helped deliver the worst economic crisis that we've seen since the Great
Depression[.]").
3. Turmoil In U.S. Credit Markets: Examining The Recent Actions of Federal
Financial Regulators: Panel I of a Hearing of the S. Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Comm., 1 1 0 1h Cong. -- (2008) [hereinafter Panel I Hearings] (statement of Ben
Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board of Governors).
4. Id. (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-CT) ("[C]onsidering everything
that was on the table in the closing hours on that Sunday, that the alternative - and I
don't think this is hyperbole - could have been devastating, both at home and around
the world for that matter.").
5. See, e.g., Michel G. Crouhy, Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, The
Subprime Credit Crisis of 2007, 16.1 J. DERIVATIVES 81, 104 n.5 (2008) ("To smooth
the deal, the Fed has taken the unprecedented step of providing US$30 billion in
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redefined market expectations for monetary policy in an economic
• • 6
crisis. The legal basis for this marked departure from the Fed's
established sphere of operations' warrants scrutiny.
The Federal Reserve System was created after "[a]
particularly severe crisis in 1907 prompted Congress to establish
the National Monetary Commission, which put forth proposals to
create an institution that would help prevent and contain financial
disruptions of this kind."9  Given this auspicious mandate, it is
financing for Bear Stearns' less liquid assets." (emphasis added)); Greg Ip, Fed
Invokes Depression-Era Law for Bear Loan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2008,
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/03/14/fed-invokes-depression-era-law-for-bear-
loan/ (discussing how rarely the Fed has resorted to this provision of the Federal
Reserve Act); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 46 ( 9th ed. 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf complete.pdf [hereinafter PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS]
("The Federal Reserve also has the authority under the Federal Reserve Act to
extend credit to entities that are not depository institutions in 'unusual and exigent
circumstances'; however, such lending has not occurred since the 1930s.").
6. See Craig Torres, Bernanke Discards Monetary History with Bear Stearns
Bailout, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=20601087&sid=aY2RvFA.yOQ&refer=home (discussing the policy implications of
"moral hazard" relative to the risk of systemic collapse). See also Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Remarks on Current Financial and Housing Markets at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp8
87.htm) ("Recent market conditions are an exception from the norm. At this time,
the Federal Reserve's recent action should be viewed as precedent only for unusual
periods of turmoil."); Tom Curry, Crisis Illustrates Power of the Unelected: For a Few
Days, at Least, Bernanke Eclipses Clinton, Obama and McCain, MSNBC.COM, Mar.17,
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23673053/ (testimony of Sen. Charles Schumer,
D-N.Y.) ("What's just as important as standing behind Bear Stearns is the idea that
they will stand behind other institutions ...."); The Today Show (NBC television
broadcast Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/21134540/vp/23687543#23687543 ("Has the government set a precedent for
propping up failing financial institutions at a time when its more traditional tools
don't appear to be working?").
7. See generally PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 27-50 (describing the
traditional tools employed by the Fed to promulgate monetary policy).
8. Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-CT)
("Given these considerations and the highly unusual and unprecedented actions
taken by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York and the support of the Department of Treasury, I believe it is appropriate -
indeed, essential that this committee, the Banking Committee, exercise its oversight
and investigatory functions to examine the authority, economic justification and the
public policy implications of these extraordinary recent actions by our nation's
federal financial regulators.").
9. See PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 1-2. But see David Fettig,
Lender of More Than Last Resort, Dec. 2002, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/public
ations papers/pub-display.cfm?id=3392 ("And it's also not clear that there was
always a lot of certainty about the Fed's original character. The following quotation is
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perhaps surprising that the Fed's original emergency powers were
quite modest under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (the Act). °
However, amendments in 19321 and 199112 to § 13(3) of the Act
gave the Fed the ability to lend freely to non-banking institutions
in "unusual and exigent circumstances."' 3 This statutory authority
made each action taken in the Bear bailout legally defensible.14 In
addition, the statutory construction has not been limited by
judicial review as the courts have largely shied away from
developing jurisprudence that interprets monetary policy. 5
Accordingly, only Congress has the power to revise or otherwise
limit the Fed's power. 6
Part II will discuss general economic and market conditions
that contributed to Bear's swift fall, highlight key events in the
Bear story, and discuss the rationale articulated by officials in
support of their decision to act. 7 Part III will present analysis that
supports the legality of the particular actions taken by the
from the Minneapolis Fed's 1921 Annual Report: 'More than seven years have
elapsed since the establishment of the Federal Reserve Banks, but there is still a
surprising lack of knowledge of what they really are and of what their proper
functions are[.J"').
10. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (2006); see also Fettig, supra
note 9.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) (originally enacted as Act of July 21, 1932) (The 1932
amendment is codified in the second paragraph of § 343); see also Fettig, supra note 9
("[T]he 1932 amendment is only meant to address crisis situations.").
12. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (amended by Pub.L. 102-242). Section 473 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 negated collateral
restrictions on emergency borrowing at the discount window, putting non-banking
institutions on the same footing as banks for the first time under § 13(3). Prior to this
amendment, major securities firms were effectively foreclosed from using emergency
credit because the Fed could not lend against securities, which constituted the bulk of
their assets. See Fettig, supra note 9; Walker F. Todd, FDICIA's Emergency
Liquidity Provisions, 29.3 ECONOMIC REVIEW - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
CLEVELAND 16, 16, 19 (1993), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Rev
iew/1993/1993-q3.pdf.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
14. See infra notes 148 - 205 and accompanying text.
15. See Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 34 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir.
1929) ("It would be an unthinkable burden upon any banking system if its open
market sales and discount rates were to be subject to judicial review.").
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 20-114 and accompanying text.
2009]
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regulators." Part IV will raise policy issues concerning the Fed's
decision to invoke § 13(3) in the Bear bailout.19
II. UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PRESENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. Economic Conditions
The defining feature of the current financial crisis is the
protracted constraint of credit. ° The financial press has popularly
titled the economic turmoil, "The Credit Crisis., 21 Nevertheless,
constrained credit is a dependent variable, an effect rather than
the underlying cause of the financial system's collapse.22 Lenders'
unwillingness to extend credit reflects their inability to reliably
evaluate the financial position of borrowers, including other
financial institutions.23  Such pervasive distrust does not arise at24
once. The meltdown of the subprime mortgage market in August
18. See infra notes 115-205 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 206-235 and accompanying text.
20. Financial Markets: Hearing Before the S. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Comm., 110th Cong. -- (2008) (testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, [hereinafter Geithner
Testimony] ("Market participants' willingness to provide term funding even against
high-quality collateral declined dramatically. As a consequence, the cost of
unsecured term funding rose precipitously and the volume shrunk... if this dynamic
continues unabated, the result would be a greater probability of widespread
insolvencies, severe and protracted damage to the financial system and, ultimately, to
the economy as a whole. This is not a theoretical risk, and it is not something that the
market can solve on its own.").
21. See, e.g., GEORGE Soros, THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS:
THE CREDIT CRISIS OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS xxi (PublicAffairs 2008); Crouhy,
Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 5 passim.
22. See Katie Benner, I Was Lucky to Get Out, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 26, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/24/news/newsmakers/benner-callan.fortune/index.htm
(interview with Erin Callan, former Chief Financial Officer, Lehman Brothers Inc.)
("The question about why within a day a bank's borrowing cost could double; that's
the heart of the matter. It's not that somebody decides overnight that a bank is twice
as risky. They wonder if their entire view was misplaced. They wonder whether
these types of organizations without deposit bases should borrow at these kinds of
rates. That worry stems from a lack of confidence in the institution.").
23. Crouhy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 5, at 95 ("[The] [a]bsence of complete
and timely data and concern about valuation methodologies . . .made investors
uncertain about valuations posted by banks in their trading books[.]").
24. Id. at 91-94. The authors describe the fair value accounting framework, under
which "nonstandard instruments" are valued pursuant to a three-tier scheme: "Level
1 - clear market prices; Level 2 - valuation using prices of related instruments; and
Level 3 - prices cannot be observed and model prices need to be used." Model prices
are theoretical and sensitive to input data and assumptions. U.S. banks reported a
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2007 is commonly identified as the origin of the financial crisis and
the basis on which mistrust and uncertainty first began to breed.25
Before the recent turmoil, however, the subprime market
saw enormous growth in post-millennia America.26  This growth
was largely fueled by credit expansion.2' The "credit boom"'2s was
itself a function of immediate monetary stimulus29 as well as
broader historical conditions tying back to the end of the Cold
War.B° To the first point, the collapse of the "dot-coin bubble, 31 in
2000 and the September 11th terrorist attacks urged the Fed to
reduce the federal funds rate32 (the "discount rate") to its lowest
level since World War 1.33  Former Fed Chairman, Alan
Greenspan, has stated that this monetary policy was viable
40% increase ($96 billion) in Level 3 assets in the first quarter of 2008. Reported
values engendered a great deal of uncertainty in the marketplace. Id. at 91-94.
25. See, e.g., Greenspan Testimony, supra note 2.
26. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039,2045 (2007) ("By the
early 1990s, technological advances made it possible to estimate and price the risk of
subprime home loan pools, paving the way for subprime securitizations. In 2005,
total securitizations of subprime and home equity loans ballooned to an estimated
$525.7 billion.").
27. See Soros, supra note 21, at 82-83.
28. Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors) ("There was a substantial credit boom that
peaked last summer. That credit boom, which was driven by international factors...
29. See Mark Gongloff, Tech's Tumble Is Bad News for All Stocks, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 30, 2008, at C1.
30. See Charlie Rose: A Conversation with Alan Greenspan (PBS television
broadcast Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/
8704 [hereinafter Charlie Rose] ("I was confronted with a major global determined
decline in long-term interest rates and inflation expectations ... this is essentially the
result of the end of the Cold War[.]").
31. See Gongloff, supra note 29.
32. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 27 ("[A] target for the interest rate
at which [deposits held by depository institutions at Federal Reserve Banks] are
traded between depository institutions.").
33. Soros, supra note 21, at xv, 82 (noting that the inflation-adjusted fed funds
rate was negative for almost three years such that the lender was, in effect, paying the
borrower to hold the loan); see also WILLIAM A. FLECKENSTEIN & FREDERICK
SHEEHAN, GREENSPAN'S BUBBLES: THE AGE OF IGNORANCE AT THE FEDERAL
RESERVE (McGraw Hill 2008) (providing a critique of Greenspan's monetary policy
at the helm of the Federal Reserve); Curry, supra note 6 (statement of Sen. Jim
Bunning, R-Ky) ("Chairman Greenspan leaves knowing that his mess will fall to his
apprentice, Ben Bernanke. I hope there is no damaging recession or financial crisis
looming. If so, I hope Ben Bernanke does not live up to his nickname of 'Helicopter
Ben,' and throw the U.S. mint's printing presses into overdrive.").
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because of the reduced risk of inflation as a result of the end of the
Cold War.34 In addition, public policy during this period promoted
home ownership among Americans.35
From this historical context, housing surged to the extent
that it began to prop up the entire economy: "Merrill Lynch
estimated that about half of all American GDP growth in the first
half of 2005 was housing related, either directly, through home
building and housing-related purchases like new furniture, or
indirectly, by spending the cash generated from the refinancing of
mortgages., 36  Mortgage markets experienced parallel growth,
benefiting directly from "rising home prices, low interest rates,
increased competition among lenders, and a wealth of capital from
lenders and mortgage securities investors., 37  However, these
market conditions also betray an insidious "system of incentives
that channeled the greed 38 fueling the housing bubble.39
Wall Street's primary role is to allocate capital efficiently
between participants in the marketplace and within the financial
system generally. 40 In return for performing this function, Wall
Street firms earn fees on the movement of capital, namely the
34. Compare Charlie Rose, supra note 30, with Greenspan Testimony, supra note
2 (arguing the present crisis arose in part because of the "protracted period of
underpricing [sic] of risk" but declining to attribute this misperception to the effect of
monetary policy).
35. Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The
Role Of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2261 & n.1 (2008)
("Commentators often cite three justifications for investing in and promoting
home ownership: (1) it builds household wealth and economic self-sufficiency; (2) it
generates positive social-psychological states; and (3) it fosters stable neighborhoods
and communities.") (citing Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American
Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home
Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 374 n.1, 406 n.177 (1994)); Steven A. Holmes,
Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at C2
(discussing policy decision to increase mortgage availability to more risky borrowers).
36. Soros, supra note 21, at xv n.1 (citation omitted).
37. See, e.g., Backgrounder on Subprime Lending, Research Solutions
(LexisNexis), 2007, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/2008010411
1942_large.pdf.
38. Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO, Dec. 2008, http://www.portfolio.com/
news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom.
39. See, e.g., Crouhy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 5, at 95 (listing fourteen
factors that helped create the credit crisis); A Mortgage Fable, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22,
2008, at A22 (arguing that regulators helped shape incentives for Wall Street and
market participants that led to the financial system's collapse).
40. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 38 ("The essential function of Wall Street is to
allocate capital-to decide who should get it and who should not.").
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transactions they service.41 Like brokers in any industry, however,
Wall Street's incentive to complete a given transaction does not
always align with the incentives of the principals involved in the
deal.42 This potential for dissonance was exacerbated over the last
two decades by the growth of securitization and derivative
financial instruments that allowed third parties to make bets and
generate profits somewhat independent of the underlying
43transaction or asset. At the same time, Wall Street firms were
allocating a growing percentage of their own capital to proprietary
• 44
trading and investments. Firms turned to these riskier sources of
revenue, amplified by leverage, to compete in an increasingly
competitive market as public corporations beholden to short-term
profits .45
Wall Street used asset-backed securities as one way to
allocate capital between borrowers and lenders, investors and
issuers.46 The money supply, greatly expanded by the Fed in
response to prior economic downturns, created demand on the buy
side as investors sought "instruments . . . offer[ing] yield
enhancement., 47 Asset-backed securities promised attractive risk-
41. Ferguson, supra note 2.
42. See Lewis, supra note 38.
43. See, e.g., Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How
to Approach the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705,
706 (2008) ("'[F]inancial engineering' of the present era succeeds in creating new
value through the highest levels of statistical analysis, in many ways actually creating
something from nothing.").
44. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 409 (2002).
45. Id. at 227-247, 312-321, 407-415 (presenting a broad overview of the
challenges to the tradition banking model over the last thirty years and the financial
services industry's dangerous responses); see also Lewis, supra at note 38 ("Nor can
you tell [John Gutfreund] that you asked him to lunch because you thought that you
could trace the biggest financial crisis in the history of the world back to a decision he
had made ... when he turned Salomon Brothers from a private partnership into Wall
Street's first public corporation ... [hje and the other partners not only made a quick
killing; they transferred the ultimate financial risk from themselves to their
shareholders. It didn't, in the end, make a great deal of sense for the shareholders...
[n]o investment bank owned by its employees would have levered itself 35 to 1 or
bought and held $50 billion in mezzanine C.D.O.'s... the hoped-for short-term gain
would not have justified the long-term hit.").
46. Crouhy, Jarrow & Turnball, supra note 5, at 82-83.
47. Id. at 82; Soros, supra note 21, at xv ("Cheap money engendered a housing
bubble.. .Investment banks on Wall Street developed a variety of new techniques to
hive credit risk off to other investors[.]").
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adjusted returns by diffusing "default risk an inch deep and a mile
wide., 48  These securities were built on the principle that the
default risk of a given loan could be diversified away by pooling
thousands of loans together into a security representing a claim to
a portion of the expected future cash flows of all the loans.49
Structured finance is not a new concept and has been used
successfully across many asset classes. ° When used prudently,
asset securitization can mitigate the cost of debt for borrowers and
provide a low risk return for investors. In this boom, however,
the virtues of securitization were challenged by excess. For
instance, mortgages were not only pooled together and securitized
once, but other securities known as collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) were created from the riskiest tranches of the original
securities." Even these second order securitizations, "which
embed leverage within their structure" to enhance returns, often
48. Serena Ng & Henry Sender, Behind Buyout Surge, A Debt Market Booms,
WALL ST. J., June 26, 2007, at Al (explaining how Wall Street securitized several
different asset classes, including mortgages, by pooling the assets and their future
cash flows together and then slicing the pool into tranches according to risk.
Securities were then sold to investors according to risk profile and ostensibly priced
off of the underlying assets.); see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 26, at 2057
(discussing the diversification of risk for investors through securitization).
49. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 26, at 2040, 2057; cf, Joseph R. Mason &
Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause
Mortgage Backed Securities an Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions,
(Hudson Inst., Working Paper, May 14, 2007), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract
=1027475 ("[T]he distinction between risk pooling, risk sharing, and diversification..
. one of the primary myths perpetuated on Wall Street is that mortgage pools are
diversified.").
50. Wilmarth, supra note 44, at 238 ("Improvements in information technology
since 1980 have enabled securities firms to transform a wide array of consumer loans
into asset-backed securities, including financial instruments backed by pools of credit
card receivables, home mortgages, and motor vehicle loans and leases."); Engel &
McCoy, supra note 26, at 2045-2048.
51. Crouhy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 5, at 103 ("Securitization allows
banks to move assets off their balance sheets, freeing up capital and spreading the
risk among many different players. These are real benefits."); cf., Michael R. Sesit,
Smart Investors Have to Wonder Who's Dumb Now, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 22,
2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aK7GbFbB20
Hc (discussing how financially "sophisticated investors" were also duped by exotic
financial instruments, but acknowledging that these instruments do still have benefits
when used correctly).
52. Soros, supra note 21, at xiv-xxiv, 82-91 (discussing generally the conditions
underlying the housing bubble); Greenspan Testimony, supra note 2 (concluding
securitization created a significant degree of "excess demand" in the home mortgage
markets, the source of the crisis).
53. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 38.
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received triple-A ratings.54 Inexpensive capital and the pervasive
assumption that home values would continue to appreciate
encouraged both the securitization of loans to increasingly risky
borrowers on the supply side and the systematic mispricing of risk
on the buy side.55 Within this mirage, institutional investors,
among others, crowded the subprime market to capture the
promised yields.56
In hindsight it seems obvious that a security based on
aggregated loans to shaky borrowers cannot eliminate risk simply
through financial machinations.57 Yet structural blinds in the
system, namely the effect of secondary markets "transferring
ownership of mortgages from bankers who knew their customers
to investors who did not[,] ' '8 and perverse incentives allowed
misperceptions to persist.6° Eventually, the collective illusion was
54. Crouhy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 5, at 82.
55. Id. at 85 ("Investors in complex credit products had considerably less
information at their disposal to assess the underlying credit quality of the assets they
held in their portfolios than the originators. As a result, these end-investors often
came to rely heavily on the risk assessments of rating agencies.").
56. Id. at 84-85 ("The pressure to increase the supply of subprime mortgages
arose because of the demand by investors for higher yielding assets ... [m]any
investor are restricted to investing in assets with certain ratings ... money market
funds are restricted to investing only in triple-A assets, and pension funds and
municipalities are restricted to investing in investment-grade assets[").
57. See Lewis, supra note 38 ("In retrospect, pretty much all of the riskiest
subprime-backed bonds were worth betting against; they would all one day be worth
zero. But at the time Eisman began to do it, in the fall of 2006, that wasn't clear.");
Fresh Air (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 17, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=94686428) (statement by law
professor Michael Greenberger) ("[A]ll these financial instruments ... are built
around the hope that people who can't afford their mortgages will somehow be able
to pay them...").
58. SOROS, supra note 21, at xvii.
59. See Judith Burns, Under Review for Revamp: The Credit-Ratings Firms, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 22, 2008, at All; Michael Hudson, How Wall Street Stoked the Mortgage
Meltdown, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007, at Al ("[M]ortgage applications with little
documentation were vulnerable to misrepresentation or overestimation of repayment
capacity by both lenders and borrowers."); Mason & Rosner, supra note 49, at 17
("These models were created in close cooperation with the investment banks that
structured CDOs."); Lewis, supra note 38 (alleging that the financial models used by
Standard & Poor's (one of the two primary ratings agencies) to calculate ratings for
these debt securities were incapable of processing a negative growth assumption for
real estate prices).
60. Croughy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 5, at 85 ("The argument could be
made that as the yields on these instruments exceeded those on equivalently rated
corporations, the market knew they were not of the same credit and/or liquidity risk.
But investors still misjudged the risk."); Engel & McCoy, supra note 26, at 2046-2063
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shattered by economic fundamentals." A glut of supply arrested
the rise in home prices, creating enough downward pressure to
burst the asset bubble.62 As home prices began to fall, borrowers
found it difficult to refinance mortgages.6  This effect was
especially harmful to subprime borrowers, many of whom held
varieties of "adjustable rate mortgages" 64 that reset to high rates
61
after an initial borrowing period and had negative amortization.
When housing prices were rising, a borrower who could not afford
the monthly payment after the interest rate reset (sometimes even
before reset) could often refinance the mortgage based on the
66higher appraised value of the property. With this option
eliminated, the number of borrower defaults quickly began to
increase and mortgage-backed securities began to lose appreciable
value.6' As with any asset bubble, sell-offs intensified downward
pressure as investors tried to exit their investments before value
declined further.68
(explaining how conservative risk estimates by ratings agencies and credit default
swap protection were factors that contributed to investor appetite).
61. See Alia McMullen, Shrinking Supply Needed to Help End U.S. Housing
Slump, FINANCIALPOST.COM, Aug.19, 2008, http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?
id=734895; accord Croughy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 5, at 83 (noting the
delinquency rates for subprime mortgages began to rise in 2005 because of
increasingly aggressive mortgage structures, increase in short-term interest rates,
decrease in the rate of home price appreciation, and even greater slack in mortgage
origination credit standards).
62. See McMullen, supra note 61; accord Croughy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note
5, at 83.
63. See generally James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Housing Pain Gauge: Nearly
1 in 6 Owners 'Under Water', WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008, at A5 ("[lit is hard for
borrowers in financial trouble to refinance or sell their homes and pay off their
mortgage if their debt exceeds the home's value.").
64. Soros, supra note 21, at xvi.
65. Id. See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 26 (discussing the negative
externalities created by subprime lending on borrowers).
66. See Michael M. Phillips, Would You Pay $103,000 For This Arizona Fixer-
Upper? That Was Ms. Halterman's Mortgage on It; 'Unfit for Human Occupancy,'
City Says, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2009, at Al (providing an extreme account of subprime
lending and securitization).
67. See Geithner Testimony, supra note 20 ("The deterioration in the U.S.
housing market late in the summer of 2007 precipitated a sharp rise in uncertainty
about the value of securitized or structure assets. Demand for those assets
contracted dramatically ... [t]his, in turn, increased funding pressures for a diverse
mix of financial institutions."); see also Croughy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 5, at
105 n.19 (citing research demonstrating a "negative correlation between home price
appreciation and subprime delinquency rate.").
68. See Geithner Testimony, supra note 20; Croughy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra
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B. Bear's Lead Role
Bear was at the center of the financial crisis well before the
firm's own demise in March 2008.69 In the summer of 2007, one of
Bear's two proprietary hedge funds, focused on bets in the
subprime mortgage market, collapsed as the value of mortgage-
backed securities quickly declined with rising borrower defaults. °
In order to preserve the firm's reputation on Wall Street, Bear lent
$3.2 billion to the fund to prop it up long enough for an orderly
liquidation. 7' Nevertheless, the fund's failure indelibly pressed
Bear onto the minds of investors and the media alike. The
implosion of the Bear fund popularly marks the beginning of the
Credit Crisis.73
In early March 2008, the rumors took on a new focus.74
Concerns spread quickly that Bear's liquidity position was
compromised.75  Of particular significance, Goldman Sachs and
Credit Suisse sent mass internal e-mails implicating Bear's
counter-party risk,76 hedge funds began exiting Bear's prime
note 5, at 105 n.19.
69. See Kate Kelly & Serena Ng, Bear Stearns Bails out Fund with Big Loan,
WALL ST. J., June 23, 2007, at Al.
70. Id. (providing an overview of the collapse of Bear Stearns' High-Grade
Structured Credit Strategies Fund and High-Grade Structured Credit Enhanced
Leverage Fund and the firm's response); see also Bryan Burrough, Bringing Down
Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2008, at 106, available at http://www.vanityfair.
com/politics/features/2008/08/bear-stearns200808 (noting that Bear deliberately
chose to focus funds on a single type of investment instead of developing a diversified
portfolio, contrary to conventional thinking).
71. Kelly & Ng, supra note 69.
72. Burrough, supra note 70 (noting that rumors persisted that Bear's financial
position was compromised and may ultimately be forced into bankruptcy).
73. See Soros, supra note 21, at xxi (noting that the collapse of the Bear funds
was, in effect, the last of several preliminary conditions that triggered the crisis);
Ferguson, supra note 2; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Leveraged Planet,
DEALBOOK.BLOGS.NYTIMES.COM, Apr. 2, 2008, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/
category/special-section-spring-2008/.
74. See Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 31,
2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boyd-bear.fortune/.
75. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Timothy F. Geithner,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York) (relating
an allegation that European trading partners had stopped doing business with Bear).
76. See Burrough, supra note 70 (discussing the hold-up of "novation" requests at
Goldman and Credit Suisse, an indemnity-like agreement used in Wall Street trading
when a third-party indemnifies a party to a contract that is concerned about counter-
party risk).
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brokerage business, and money-market funds reversed positions
with exposure to Bear's commercial paper.77 By Thursday, March
13, 2008, Bear could not find sufficient overnight funding via "repo
lenders"7 8 to conduct business on Friday.79
New York Federal Reserve Bank President Timothy
Geithner ° characterized the larger chain of events that felled Bear
as:
[S]imilar to the classic pattern in financial crises.
Asset price declines triggered by concern about the
outlook for economic performance led to a
reduction in the willingness to bear risk and to
margin calls. Borrowers needed to sell assets to
meet the calls; some highly leveraged firms were
unable to meet their obligations and their
counterparties responded by liquidating the
collateral they held."1
Bear's CEO, Alan Schwartz, noted more pointedly: "Due
to the stressed condition of the credit market as a whole and the
unprecedented speed at which rumors and speculation travel and
echo through the modern financial media environment, the rumors
and speculation ultimately became a self-fulfilling prophecy., 82 In
77. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Timothy F. Geithner,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
78. About.com: Investing for Beginners, Repurchase Agreements, http://
beginnersinvest.about.com/lw/Business-Finance/Personal-finance/Repurchase-
Agreements.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) (explaining that "repo" is short for
"repurchase agreements" in which the borrower sells securities for cash to a lender
and agrees to buy back the securities at a later date).
79. See, e.g., Burrough, supra note 70; Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement
of Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York).
80. In November 2008, President-elect Barack Obama nominated Geithner to be
the Secretary of the Treasury in the incoming Administration. See Jeff Zeleny,
Obama Unveils Team to Tackle 'Historic' Crisis in Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/us/politics/24obama.html?_r=l&scp=5&sq=
geithner%20and%20appointment%20and%20secretary%20of%20treasury&st=cse.
81. Geithner Testimony, supra note 20.
82. Turmoil In U.S. Credit Markets: Examining The Recent Actions of Federal
Financial Regulators: Panel II of a Hearing of the S. Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Comm., 110h Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Panel H Hearings] (statement of Alan
Schwartz, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Bear Stearns Companies).
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fact, the SEC did commence ongoing investigations into the role of
short-sellers in Bear's collapse.83
C. Regulatory Response
In his testimony before Congress on April 3, 2008,
Geithner briefly described the two substantive actions taken by
regulators in the Bear bailout that are the subject of this note:
(1) the decision on the morning of March 14 to
extend a non-recourse loan through the discount
window to JPMorgan Chase so that JPMorgan could
in turn lend that money to Bear Stearns; (2) the
decision on March 16 by JPMorgan Chase and
Bearn Stearns for JPMorgan Chase to acquire Bear
and guarantee certain of its liabilities, along with an
agreement in principle that the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York would provide certain financing
in the context of that acquisition[.]
The March 14 decision was reached after the SEC, the Fed,
and Treasury debated the implications of a Bear bankruptcy filing
on Friday morning to the financial system. 85 The midnight deal
allowed Bear to open on Friday, but it proved insufficient to shore
86
up confidence in the markets during trading that day. Secretary
Paulson issued an unexpected ultimatum to Schwartz early Friday
evening to find a buyer for Bear by the end of the weekend or else
the credit line would be extinguished. 7
83. Kara Scannell & Jenny Strasburg, Hedge Funds Subpoenaed in SEC Probe,
WALL ST. J., July 15, 2008, at C3.
84. Geithner Testimony, supra note 20.
85. Id. (noting the deliberate policy judgment that was made to circumvent the
market dynamics that had ostensibly caused Bear's bankruptcy).
86. See Panel II Hearings, supra note 82 (statement of Alan Schwartz, President
and Chief Executive Officer, The Bear Stearns Companies).
87. See Panel II Hearings, supra note 82 (statement of Alan Schwartz, President
and Chief Executive Officer, The Bear Stearns Companies) (commenting on the
difference of opinion that arose between Bear executives and government officials as
to the meaning of the "28 days" language inserted in the credit agreement on
Thursday night); see also Burrough, supra note 70 (statement of Henry M. Paulson,
Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury) ("You've got the weekend to do a deal with J.
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Bear worked with financial advisors throughout the
weekend to find a white knight.8 Ultimately, the immediacy of the
deadline thwarted all potential buyers except for JPMorgan. 9
However, even management at JPMorgan began to back away
from the opportunity as late as Sunday morning.0 Considering
their fiduciary duties to shareholders, JPMorgan CEO, Jamie
Dimon, and head of Investment Banking, Steve Black, were
alarmed by the risk in the transaction given the overall fragility of
the markets and economic climate, the riskiness of their own
balance sheet, and the lack of time to conduct due diligence and
value Bear's illiquid assets. 91
Remarkably, regulators still managed to structure a deal
before the end of the weekend that was agreeable to JPMorgan. 9
On March 16, JPMorgan announced it would acquire Bear in a
stock-for-stock exchange, valuing the firm at approximately $2 per
share.93 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York agreed to "lend
$29 billion in connection with the acquisition.., against a portfolio
of $30 billion in assets of Bear Stearns." 94 In addition, JPMorgan
agreed to sign a $1 billion note." Both loans would be made to a
Delaware limited liability company (the LLC) set up to house the
Bear assets and to be managed by Blackrock Financial
Management, Inc." The LLC would be liquidated according to a
P. Morgan or anyone else you can find. But if you're not done by Monday, we're
pulling the plug.").
88. See Burrough, supra note 70 (noting that the premier investment banker in
the financial institutions space, Garry Parr of Lazard Freres, was hired by Bear
Stearns).
89. Id. (commenting that would-be suitors were particularly frightened by the
lack of time to conduct customary due diligence).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Panel II Hearings, supra note 82 (statement of James Dimon, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, JPMorgan Chase).
93. Press Release, JP Morgan Chase, JPMorgan Chase to Acquire Bear Stearns
(Mar. 16, 2008), available at http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/Satellite?c=JPMContent_
C&cid=1159338557604&pagename=JPM-redesign%2FJPMContent_C%2FGeneric
_DetailPageTemplate.
94. Press Release, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Summary of Terms and
Conditions Regarding the JPMorgan Chase Facility (Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter
Press Release for JPMorgan Facility], available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/
news/markets/2008/rp080324b.html.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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waterfall that subordinated the JPMorgan loan to that of the Fed,
ensuring the New York Fed would be the first to be paid back.97
Beyond the JPMorgan $1 billion protection, however, Secretary
Paulson's signature meant that the Treasury (implicitly, U.S.
taxpayers) was on the hook if Bear defaulted on the loan to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.98
D. Rationale: "Not too big to fail, too interlinked to fail"99
Regulators' concerns about the fallout from a Bear
bankruptcy filing were twofold.1' ° First, they believed that Bear's
role as an intermediary in the huge market for derivatives trades
inextricably linked the firm to thousands of counterparties around
the world. 11 "[I]f the middle broker goes down - and neither side
has confidence that the paper they hold can be redeemed, then the
whole worldwide thing melts down."1 2 Second, a bankruptcy filing
would flood an already vulnerable market with Bear's illiquid
assets at fire sale prices.' °3 This would be devastating under the
fair value accounting regime governing U.S. institutions. 4 "When
97. Id.
98. Burrough, supra note 70 ("At one point, Paulson had to sign a document
confirming that, yes, in the event Bear defaulted on its securities, the American
taxpayer would pay the tab."); see also Todd, supra note 12, at 20-21 ("The extension
of the federal financial safety net to nonbanks may increase the probability of market
liquidity crises that appear to require Federal Reserve emergency lending. This
could happen during periods of market stress if the costs of risky investment and
funding strategies are not fully borne by the managers and shareholders of nonbank
firms, but instead are perceived as being partially or fully underwritten by U.S.
taxpayers.").
99. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Senator Robert Bennett).
100. Id.
101. Id. But cf, Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 Bus. LAW. 1507,
1509-1511 (describing the public policy Congress explicitly pursued in the 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, choosing to exempt derivatives contracts from
the automatic stay in bankruptcy in order to protect financial institutions and
financial markets).
102. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Senator Robert Bennett).
103. Id. (statement of Timothy Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
104. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 157 (FASB 157), Sept. 2006, at 2, available at http://www.fa
sb.org/st/index.shtml ("The transaction to sell the asset or transfer the liability is a
hypothetical transaction at the measurement date, considered from the perspective of
a market participant that holds the asset or owes the liability . .. This Statement
emphasizes that fair value is a market-based measurement, not an entity-specific
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the already thin market for those assets freezes up and only a
handful of transactions occur at extremely depressed prices,"' 5
those prices still form the market by which institutions must value
similar assets on their own books. As a result, these institutions
would write down assets and suffer attendant losses on the income
statement. °6 In turn, equity cushions, already wildly insufficient at
many institutions, would be crushed, creating the need to raise
capital.07  Shareholders would be diluted and lenders would
require more collateral be posted: "[A] self-reinforcing downward
spiral[.]""'8
The regulators described a bifurcated rationale underlying
their decision to intervene in the Bear collapse: 9 first, they
defined the particular position occupied by Bear in the financial
system; and second, they evaluated the economic stability of the
financial system and concluded Bear was too interconnected and
the financial system too disorderly to absorb the bankruptcy
fluidly."0 Apart from semantics, it is plain that the "too interlinked
to fail" rationale articulated does not meaningfully depart from the
"too big to fail doctrine" (TBTF)."' Arguably, the "implicit
subsidy"12 that has historically benefited large banks in the capital
markets and encouraged increased risk taking pursuant to the
TBTF doctrine, had also been imputed to securities firms, like113 • j114
Bear."' In one sense, at least, the Bear bailout was preordained .
measurement. Therefore, a fair value measurement should be determined based on
the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability.").
But see William M. Issac, How to Save the Financial System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19,
2008, at A23 (questioning FASB 157 and offering a compelling argument against
mark to market accounting); see also Crouhy, Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 5.
105. Issac, supra note 104.
106. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Timothy F. Geithner,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
107. See id; Wilmarth, supra note 44.
108. See Panel II Hearings, supra note 82 (statement of Timothy Geithner,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
109. See Geithner Testimony, supra note 20.
110. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors) (explaining the regulators' specific economic
arguments for the necessity of action).
111. Wilmarth, supra note 44, at 300-313 (giving the history of the TBTF doctrine
and its troubling implications for the financial system).
112. Id. at 301.
113. Todd, supra note 12, at 20 (arguing that the FDICIA amendment to § 13(3)
of the Federal Reserve Act changed the rules for securities firms in terms of risk
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III. LEGAL MOORINGS OF FED ACTION
A. Organization of the Federal Reserve System
"The Federal Reserve System is the central bank of the
United States. It was founded by Congress in 1913 to provide the
nation with a safer, more flexible, and more stable monetary and
financial system."' 15 The System has three main parts, the Board
of Governors (the Board), the Reserve Banks and the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC)
The Board is a federal agency comprised of seven members
serving fourteen year terms.' Members are appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. The Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the Board are appointed and confirmed to four year
terms and are typically selected from the existing members of the
board."8
The Reserve banks are organized by geographic districts in
a manner similar to the Federal court system."9 Together, the
Board and the Reserve Banks are responsible for "supervising and
regulating certain financial institutions and activities, for providing
banking services to depository institutions and the federal
government, and for ensuring that consumers receive adequate
information and fair treatment in their business with the banking
system."'2 ° Depository institutions must maintain balances at the
management and financing options); see also Wilmarth, supra note 44, at 225
(discussing the problems of "moral hazard" and "regulatory forbearance" within the
financial system vis-A-vis large financial institutions).
114. Id. at 22 ("[C]ontinued observance of a too-big-to-fail doctrine in this case,
for nonbanks), and the absence of adequate procedural safeguards could increase
Reserve Banks' and, ultimately, taxpayers' losses from § 13(3) lending activities in
the future. Furthermore, greater potential access to the federal financial safety net
could boost the risk-taking incentives for nonbanks, thereby increasing the
probabilities that they will request discount window lending during financial
emergencies.").
115. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 1.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 4 (explaining that appointments are staggered and a Board member
may (and usually does) leave the position before expiration).
118. Id. (explaining that the directors may also "be simultaneously appointed to
the Board.").
119. Id.
120. Id. at 3. In particular, the Reserve Banks "carry out a variety of System
functions, including operating a nationwide payments system, distributing the
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Reserve Banks or keep a percentage of deposits as cash in that
institution's vault.
12
'
These balances are "actively trade[d]. . .with each other,
usually overnight, on an uncollateralized basis, 122 in what is called
the "federal funds market., 123 Demand is driven by the depository
institutions' need to maintain sufficient reserve balances in light of
variable withdrawals by their own depositors.12 ' Based on this
variable demand curve, supply is constantly manipulated by the
FOMC to maintain a targeted rate of trading called the federal
funds rate (fed funds rate). 25 The FOMC votes periodically to
decide the "target range" for the fed funds rate.26
The FOMC is a committee formed by the Board and five
Reserve Bank presidents, one of which is always the President of
the Reserve Bank of New York. Under ordinary economic
conditions, the FOMC controls supply in the federal funds market
primarily using its "open market operations."' 28  Open market
operations are the buying and selling of U.S. Treasury securities
("Treasuries") by the Fed, 29  on an "outright (also called
nation's currency and coin, supervising and regulating member banks and bank
holding companies, and serving as banker for the U.S. Treasury." Fed revenues are
principally drawn from interest on U.S. government securities, interest on foreign
currency investments and interest on loans made to depository institutions. Net
income flows to the U.S. Treasury. See id. at 11.
121. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 30.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. A depository institution must have "vault cash" equal to a fraction of its
deposits as set by the Federal Reserve. This level is called the "required reserve
balance." In addition, depository institutions will maintain a "contractual clearing
balance" beyond the "required reserve balance" as a cushion against unexpected
transactions. While the institutions earn no interest on their required balances, they
do earn interest on the clearing balance. Likewise, institutions may hold another
level of protection against unexpected withdrawals called "excess reserve balances."
Individually and collectively these balances fluctuate daily. See id. at 28-32.
125. Id. at 32; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
126. Id. at 35.
127. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 11, 36-38.
128. See id. at 45 (noting that the Fed's lending through the discount window
becomes a more important monetary tool in times of economic stress); see also Fettig,
supra note 9 ("We should also note here that by the 1930s the discount window had
given way to open market operations as the preferred method of controlling the
nation's supply of credit[.]").
129. Id. at 35, 37 (stating that the FOMC directs the New York Fed to conduct
open market operations).
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permanent) basis or temporarily in the form of repurchase
agreements. '"13  Open market operations are actually somewhat
more complex, but the underlying principle is relatively
straightforward."' The Fed expands and contracts the money
supply by buying and selling Treasuries, which are debt
securities.32 When the Fed sells securities, the money supply
shrinks because the purchase price is taken out of the money
supply.'33 When the Fed buys back securities the money supply
increases by the amount paid out by the Fed for the securities.'
Decreasing the money supply increases the fed funds rate;
increasing the money supply decreases the fed funds rate.'35
In times of extraordinary stress, the Fed uses a second tool,
"[secured] lending at the discount window" to affect monetary
policy. 136 This mechanism "serves two primary functions:" first, it
complements open market operations in achieving the target
federal funds rate by making Federal Reserve balances available
to depository institutions when the supply of balances falls short; 37
second, "[i]t also serves as a backup source of liquidity for
individual depository institutions."'38  Historically, the discount
window is the tool by which the Fed fulfills its role as "lender of
last resort" in times of financial stress.139
Direct lending typically proceeds under "primary,
secondary, and seasonal credit programs"14  to depository
institutions. However, depository institutions avoid borrowing
through these programs because of a negative signaling effect in
the markets.14' A large downward reaction in a firm's stock price
130. Id. at 32.
131. See infra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
132. See PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 37-40.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 45.
137. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5.
138. Id.
139. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Timothy Geithner, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
140. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 46-49 (distinguishing these
programs by purpose and spread over the fed funds rate).
141. Sudeep Reddy, Fed Extends Lending Programs as Threats Persist: Move
Reflects Worry Over 'Fragile' State of Financial Market, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2008, at
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may even offset the immediate liquidity provided by the credit.'
The Fed instituted the Term Auction Facility Program (TAF) in
December 2007, as a mechanism to counteract this dynamic and
encourage borrowing among depository institutions. 4 3  Non
depository institutions may also borrow at the discount window in
extreme conditions.'" Prior to March 2008, however, the Fed had
not made the finding necessary under the statute to lend to
institutions other than banks since the Great Depression.14' Even
then, "[j]ust 123 loans were made under the unusual and exigent
provision over four years in the 1930s by the Federal Reserve,
totaling about $1.5 million.', 146 Given the reluctance of depository
institutions to borrow at the discount window, it is not surprising
that a non-depository institution would face even greater stigma.
B. Statutory Authority
Speaking before the Economic Club of New York just after
the Bear bailout, Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A.
Volcker148 offered the following critique:
A3 ("That program was created as an alternative to the Fed's discount window,
which is generally used by banks for last-minute funding needs but can carry a stigma
because an institution fears being seen as troubled.").
142. Id.
143. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Term Auction
Facility, (Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
monetary/20071212a.htm (describing the TAF).
144. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
145. Todd, supra note 12, at 18 n.14 ("The Board has reactivated Section 13(3)
rarely since the 1930s, but this emergency lending authority has not actually been
used since 1936. It was activated for savings and loan associations, mutual savings
banks, and nonmember commercial banks in 1966 and 1969." (citation omitted));
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 46 (stating that the Fed has not lent to a
non-depository institutions since the 1930s).
146. Hoover-Era Law Was Behind Fed-Treasury Debates, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/11/09/hoover-era-law-was-behind-fed-treas
ury-debatesl.
147. See Meena Thiruvengadam, Investment Bank Borrowing at Discount Window
Hits Record, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1222378066
11776365.html (noting that investment banks refused to use the "primary dealer
credit facility" created specifically for broker-dealers after the collapse of Bear
Stearns, until they were pushed to the brink).
148. Volcker has been selected by President Barack Obama as a top economic
adviser in the new administration. See Government Moves Rally Stocks, WASH. POST,
Nov. 30, 2008, at F06.
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[T]he Federal Reserve judged it necessary to take
actions that extend to the very edge of its lawful and
implied powers ... The extension of lending directly
to non-banking financial institutions - while under
the authority of nominally "temporary" emergency
powers will surely be interpreted as an implied
promise of similar action in times of future turmoil.
What appears to be in substance a direct transfer of
mortgage and mortgage-backed securities of
questionable pedigree from an investment bank to
the Federal Reserve seems to test the time honored
central bank mantra in times of crisis - "lend freely
at high rates against good collateral" - tested to the
point of no return.14 9
Volcker's commentary is particularly helpful in framing the
statutory analysis set forth below because it illustrates how
monetary policy precedent can be confused with the Fed's legal
authority.5 This is not surprising given the "reflexive" nature of
the Fed's relationship with financial markets."'51
Financial markets are forward-looking and participants
ascribe value to assets through the exchange of information.1 2 In
fact, federal securities laws require transparency and disclosure
principally to facilitate the flow of information among market
participants.' As a market participant itself, the Fed must act
149. Paul A. Volcker, Former Chairman, Federal Reserve System, Keynote
Address at the 395th Meeting of the Economic Club of New York 2(Apr. 8, 2008)
[hereinafter Volcker Speech] (transcript available at http://econclubny.org/files/
TranscriptVolckerApril_2008.pdf).
150. See infra notes 152-169 and accompanying text.
151. See Soros, supra note 21, at 50 ("[T]here is a two-way connection between
thinking and reality which, when it operates simultaneously, introduces an element of
uncertainty in to the participants' thinking and an element of indeterminacy into the
course of events.").
152. Christopher Paul Saari, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic
Theory and The Regulation of The Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1031
(1977) (defining the "Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis.").
153. Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 382-383 (2005) ("Instead, the 1933 Act was premised solely
on a system mandating full and fair disclosure to investors, under the guidance of a
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with a level of consistency in order to pursue its stated goals of
"maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates.' 5 4 Over time, the role of the Federal Reserve has
been defined by the precedent of its own actions."' This effect,
which has real and powerful implications in the markets, is far
different, however, than the boundaries of Fed authority
circumscribed by law.
15 6
The Fed's authority to lend to a non-depository institution
comes from § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the
affirmative vote of not less than five members, may
authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such
periods as the said board may determine, at rates
established in accordance with the provisions of
section 14, subdivision (d) of this Act, to discount
for any individual, partnership, or corporation,
notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes,
drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or
otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal
reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any
such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an individual
or a partnership or corporation the Federal reserve
bank shall obtain evidence that such individual,
partnership, or corporation is unable to secure
adequate credit accommodations from other
banking institutions. All such discounts for
individuals, partnerships, or corporations shall be
subject to such limitations, restrictions, and
federal agency, as a mechanism for permitting informed investment decisions.
Disclosure rather than a merit approach remains the regulatory philosophy of the
federal securities laws today.").
154. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 15.
155. Cf., Ip, supra note 5 (understanding the significance of Fed action in terms of
how often a given action has been taken, not whether legal authority for the action
exits).
156. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
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regulations as the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System may prescribe.'157
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York expressly cited
this provision as authority for the loans made on March 14 and
March 16, 2008, respectively.1 8 The statute provides that certain
conditions be met in order for the Fed to properly extend credit to
a non-depository institution Monetary policy precedent may
distort the stringency of the legal standard demanded by these
conditions. The Bear bailout illustrates how, in practice, the
conditions on lending to a non-depository institution tend to
dovetail so that the legal standard is actually a quite low threshold1. • • • 161
relative to monetary policy constraints.
Section 13(3) first requires that "unusual and exigent
circumstances, 162 be present in order for the Board to consider
extending credit. "Unusual" and "exigent" are not defined terms
under the statute. 163  Webster's defines "unusual" to be
"uncommon" or "rare' 164 and "exigent" as "requiring immediate
aid or action., 165  Neither generic definition provides much
specificity, which suggests the interpretation was left open to the
Board's discretion. 66 Chairman Bernanke offered this reading of
the provision in his testimony before Congress: "We have a very
high bar for unusual and exigent, so this is twice in 75 years that
157. Id.
158. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Timothy Geithner, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Press Release for
JPMorgan Facility, supra note 94 ("The Federal Reserve loan is being provided
under the authority granted by section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Board
authorized the New York Fed to enter into this loan and made the findings required
by section 13(3) at a meeting on Sunday, March 16, 2008.").
159. 12 U.S.C. §343 (2006).
160. See supra notes151-156 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 162-205 and accompanying text.
162. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
163. 12 U.S.C. § 221 (2006).
164. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dict
ionary/unusual (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
165. Id., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exigent (last visited Jan. 26,
2009).
166. C.f., Fettig, supra note 9 (noting President Hoover's expectation that this
emergency provision would be limited to times of crisis was not unanimous and there
was ongoing debate at the time of the 1932 amendment as to the proper role of the
Fed in the nation's economy).
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we've used this - we've applied this power." '167 Bernanke's
subsequent testimony makes clear the Board interpreted the
"unusual and exigent" standard in light of economic
• -• 168
considerations. Therefore, under the assumption that the
Board's interpretation controls, the "high bar" that must be
surmounted to find "unusual and exigent circumstances" is to be
contemplated on the basis of economics and monetary policy
rather than law.
169
Next, "the affirmative vote of not less than five members"'17
is required under the statute before credit may be extended.
Normally, a vote by five members would be a super-majority
because there are seven members on the Board.'71 In this instance,
a quorum was never reached with respect to the March 14 decision
because there were two vacant seats on the Board and one
member was traveling.' If at least two members are present, then
a unanimous vote among those present is sufficient under an
exception provided for in § 11 of the Act.7  This provision does
require one incremental condition be met before the exception can
apply, "action on the matter is necessary to prevent, correct, or
mitigate serious harm to the economy or the stability of the
financial system of the United States., 17 4 This extra stipulation is
superfluous under the Fed's current interpretation of "unusual and
exigent circumstances."' Geithner's testimony is illustrative: "It's
the combination of [Bear's intermediary role and the
circumstances prevailing in markets at the time] that made it so
exceptionally risky for the U.S. economy., 17 6 Furthermore, as a
167. Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors).
168. Id. ("In thinking about [the standard], we thought not only about the
interconnectedness of Bear Stearns and the issues we've raised, but also about the
situation in the financial markets more generally... But given the weakness and the
fragility of many markets, we thought the combination was indeed unusual and
exigent.").
169. Id.
170. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
171. See supra Part III(A).
172. Ip, supra note 5.
173. 12 U.S.C. § 248(r)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (2006).
174. Id. at § (r)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
175. See supra notes 162-169 and accompanying text.
176. Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Timothy Geithner, President and
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matter of statutory construction, the absence of this language in §
13(3) suggests that "unusual and exigent circumstances" does not
contemplate this incremental restriction.17 By inference, the legal
basis for "unusual and exigent circumstances" may be even less
stringent than the Fed's monetary policy would indicate."'
Section 13(3) expressly provides for credit to be extended
in the form of a "discount. '" 7 9 The consequence of this language
arises from an esoteric distinction between "advances" and
"discounts," the two mechanisms by which the Fed extends
credit.'80 With an advance, "the depository [institution] issues its
own promissory note to the Federal Reserve, and the private-
sector security is the collateral....' "In the discounting method of
lending, a bank would present a short-term business loan or other
asset meeting the type and maturity specifications of the Federal
Reserve Act, and the Federal Reserve Bank would extend credit
in an amount reflecting the value of the asset at maturity minus a
'discount' based on the Federal Reserve's discount rate and the
time until maturity of the asset.'
182
For most of the last century, advances have been the only
type of credit offered through the discount window to depository
•• 181
institutions because they offer several advantages over discounts.
First, they provide a more straightforward credit mechanism
because they are essentially secured loans."' Second, when
lending to depositories, the criteria defining acceptable collateral is
much broader under an advance than it is under a discount.85
Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York) (emphasis added).
177. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 248(r)(1)-(2)(b), 343 (2006).
178. See supra notes 151-169 and accompanying text.
179. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
180. See David H. Small & James A. Clouse, The Limits the Federal Reserve Act
Places on the Monetary Policy Actions of the Federal Reserve, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING
L. 553, 560-563 (2000).
181. Id. at 555.
182. Steven R. Blau, Book Note, The Federal Reserve and European Central Bank
as Lenders-of-Last-Resort: Different Needles in Their Compasses, 21 N.Y. INT'L L.
REV. 39, 51 n.84 (omitting citation); see also Small & Clouse, supra note 179, at 559
n.26 (providing a historical analysis of the precise differences between discounts and
advances).
183. See Small & Clouse, supra note 180, at 561.
184. Id.
185. Id. at n.31.
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Collateral for an advance in this context need only be
"satisfactory" to the Reserve Bank extending credit.186
By contrast, eligible collateral to secure a discount to a
depository institution is far more restricted.187  Collateral has to
satisfy the "real bills"' doctrine under § 13(2).189 "In essence, the
only acceptable collateral [under this doctrine is] near substitutes
for cash."' 9 Under § 13(3), the Fed may only extend credit in the
form of a discount."' Thus, the real bills doctrine is a very
restrictive condition embedded within the provision.19
However, Section 473 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) amended §
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, negating the force of the real
193bills doctrine. After the amendment, the controlling language
became "or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal
reserve bank.' ' 194  The Fed was effectively granted complete
discretion to accept any types of collateral for a discount made in
"unusual and exigent circumstances. '" 19'
Section 13(3) also expressly requires a showing that "such
individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure
adequate credit accommodations from other banking
institutions., 196  According to testimony by New York Fed
President Geithner, this showing is presumed to be indistinct from
the finding of "unusual and exigent circumstances." '197  To
186. Id. at 561 (opining that "even equity shares" would be acceptable under this
standard).
187. See infra notes 188-192 and accompanying text.
188. Id. at 573.
189. 12 U.S.C. § 343 para. 1 (2006).
190. Todd, supra note 12, at 18.
191. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
192. See Todd, supra note 12, at 19 ("[T]he reason why the Reserve Banks were
prohibited from extending credit on stocks and bonds [under Section 13] was that the
[Reserve] Banks were intended to assist commercial banking and not investment
banking[.]").
193. 12 U.S.C. § 343 historical and statutory notes (2006); see also Todd, supra
note 12, at 19.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
195. See Small & Clouse, supra note 180, at 15 & n.32.
196. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
197. See Geithner Testimony, supra note 20 ("The Board of Governors is
empowered to authorize a Federal Reserve Bank like the New York Fed to lend to a
corporation ... in extraordinary circumstances under which there is evidence that the
corporation cannot 'secured adequate credit accommodations from other banking
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incorporate this condition into the interpretation of "unusual and
exigent circumstances" is reasonable because it would make little
sense for the Fed to provide credit to such an institution
otherwise." Furthermore, the psychology of the markets seems to
ensure that this condition would otherwise be satisfied. 99
Finally, judicial precedent has removed the Fed's
judgments around monetary policy from judicial oversight.2°° In
particular, the courts have taken the position that the effectiveness
of monetary policy would be subverted if it were to be second-
guessed by judicial review.' Given this position by the courts, the
legality of the Fed's actions on March 14 and March 16, 2008
related to the bailout of Bear is demonstrated under the statutory
analysis laid out above. °2 Section 13(3) grants the Fed expansive
authority in "unusual and exigent circumstances, '"2' 3 without
requiring a stringent legal standard be met in order to respond to
crises.2 4 In practice, the Fed is more constrained by market
psychology that demands a consistent monetary policy than by
statutory limitations on its authority.05
IV. SECTION 13(3) IS A DOUBLE-EDGED CATCH-22 6
The Fed is charged with conducting the nation's monetary
policy, overseeing certain financial institutions and managing the
institutions.").
198. See id.
199. See supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
200. Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 34 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir.1929)
("It would be an unthinkable burden upon any banking system if its open market
sales and discount rates were to be subject to judicial review.").
201. See Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat.'l Bank, 559 F.2d 863, 868 (2d
Cir. 1977) ("[T]he granting of rescue funds to [Franklin National Bank] by the
[Federal Reserve Bank] were exercises of judgment by the public officials concerned
and were well within their competence and authority. Absent clear evidence of
grossly arbitrary or capricious action on the part of either or both of them -- a factor
which does not appear to be present here -- it is not for the courts to say whether or
not the actions taken were justified in the public interest, particularly where it vitally
concerned the operation and stability of the nation's banking system.").
202. See supra notes 149-199 and accompanying text.
203. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
204. See supra notes 149-199 and accompanying text.
205. Id.
206. Heller, supra note 1.
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financial system to prevent systemic risk in financial markets.207 In
order to carry out these duties in times of crisis, the Fed acts as the
"lender of last resort."2 s Given this express duty, the existence of
an emergency provision like § 13(3) in the statutory scheme is
essential. 9 Ironically, however, the presence of § 13(3) and the
Fed's proper exercise of authority pursuant to § 13(3) creates a
double-edged catch-22 that may ultimately challenge the
usefulness of the provision, if not its legality.210 The Bear bailout is
instructive.2
First, the mere presence of § 13(3) may help produce the
212
very circumstances that require its use. Market participants
make decisions based upon the information available to them."' It
has been argued that traditional banks have benefited from an
"implicit subsidy" under the TBTF doctrine because the market
discounts risk for these institutions to reflect the expectation that
the government would not allow any of these institutions to fail.
4
These institutions have reacted to the subsidy with greater risk-
taking and increased leverage.215 The market likely incorporated
the practical meaning of the 1991 FDICIA amendment to § 13(3),
which negated collateral restrictions on emergency credit by the
216Fed, into risk assumptions for major securities firms, like Bear.
Thus, while § 13(3) was amended precisely to help avert financial
panic given the prospect of a securities firm's failure,217 the
207. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 5, at 1.
208. Geithner Testimony, supra note 20 ("A driving force behind Congress'
creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1914 was its recognition of the need for a
public institution to perform the role of lender of last resort.").
209. See Blau, supra note 182, at 44 ("[The Fed] has clear and express statutory
authority to lend to banks for the sake of their stabilization.").
210. See infra notes 212 - 234 and accompanying text.
211. Id.
212. See infra notes 213-218 and accompanying text.
213. See Saari, supra note 152, at 1031.
214. Wilmarth, supra note 44, at 301.
215. Id. (noting the implicit subsidy has helped keep the cost of borrowing for
these institutions artificially low).
216. Todd, supra note 12, at 20-21 n.21.
217. Id. at 20 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-CT) ("It [FDICIA] also
includes a provision I offered to give the Federal Reserve greater flexibility to
respond in instances in which the overall financial system threatens to collapse. My
provision allows the Fed more power to provide liquidity, by enabling it to make fully
secured loans to securities firms in instances similar to the 1987 stock market crash.).
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amendment may have induced the set of circumstances demanding
218its use.
Given these assumptions, Bear's collapse may be viewed as
a somewhat predictable outcome. 219 Likewise, the Fed's response
at the point of collapse was predictable insofar as the magnitude of
the situation left officials with no choice but to act.22° Yet,
subsequent events in the unfolding crisis presented regulators with
a strikingly similar situation when Lehman Brothers (Lehman)
faced a parallel collapse in September 2008.221 The Fed declined to
bail out Lehman222 and the firm filed for bankruptcy protection on
September 15, 2008 in the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S.
history.223 The bankruptcy filing immediately sent the financial
system into a tailspin, convincing the Fed and Treasury to bail out
American International Group Inc. (AIG) with an $85 billion loan
just two days later.224 In less than two weeks, Congress passed the
218. Todd, supra note 12, at 20-21 ("The extension of the federal financial safety
net to nonbanks may increase the probability of market liquidity crises that appear to
require Federal Reserve emergency lending. This could happen during periods of
market stress if the costs of risky investment and funding strategies are not fully
borne by the managers and shareholders of nonbank firms, but instead are perceived
as being partially or fully underwritten by U.S. taxpayers."). But see Ferguson, supra
note 2 ("This hunt for scapegoats is futile. To understand the downfall of [the global
financial system], you need to take several steps back and locate this crisis in the long
run of financial history. Only then will you see that we have all played a part in this
latest sorry example of what the Victorian journalist Charles Mackay described in his
1841 book, 'Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds."').
219. Todd, supra note 12, at 20-21.
220. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors) (explaining the regulators' specific economic
arguments for the necessity of action).
221. See generally Andrew Ross Sorkin, How the Fed Reached out to Lehman,
DEALBOOK.BLOGS.NYTMES.COM, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/
16/business/16sorkin.html? r=l.
222. Derek Kravitz, Behind-Scenes Frenzy Led to Lehman Collapse, WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 2008, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/washingtonpostinvestigations/2008/
09/behind-the-scenesfrenzy-led-u.html ("Paulson was not inclined to help save
Lehman after similar moves with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Bear Stearns. The
Wall Street Journal reported that Paulson felt such a buyout 'would create a terrible
precedent."').
223. See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 221 ("But no one, least of all government
officials, has fully explained why Lehman, one of the grand old names of Wall Street,
was allowed to fail while so many others were rescued. Many people, at least on Wall
Street, have come to view the decision to let Lehman die as one of the biggest
blunders in this whole financial crisis. Christine Lagarde, France's finance minister,
called the decision 'a genuine error."').
224. Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath,
U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit
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Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 which included the
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to shore up
the balance sheets of financial institutions.225
On first blush, the Lehman collapse reveals an ad hoc
policy 226 that developed once the emergency powers were
invoked-Lehman faced remarkably similar circumstances to
those faced by Bear in March 2008, yet the Fed responded in
exactly opposite ways.22' At a deeper level, however, the near
apocalyptic effects of the Lehman bankruptcy on the global
financial system demonstrate how truly constrained regulators
were by market expectations once the Fed initially chose to act to
save Bear under § 13(3).228 The market forced the Fed to extend
credit to more and more institutions as the crisis continued to
deepen.229
This pattern raises the second catch-22 of § 13(3). While
the Fed's initial response to rescue Bear were legal under §
1 3 (3 ),230 subsequent actions raise questions about whether the Fed
Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at Al.
225. Christopher J. Dodd, D-CT, Chairman, U.S. S. Comm. On Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, Summary of the "Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,"
available at http:/Ibanking.senate.gov/publiclfiles/latestversionEESASummary.pdf;
see also, Mark Landler & Edmund L. Andrews, For Treasury Dept., Now Comes
Hard Part of Bailout, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al (discussing the practicalities of
trying to implement TARP successfully).
226. See Fed Chairman's Q&A on Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122409761899937343.html [hereinafter Bernanke
Q&A] ("In Bear Stearns and in AIG and Lehman and in all of the other things
we've dealt with, there is no such system, there is no resolution system. There is no
set of rules, there's no funding, there's no authorizations. So that everything that was
done with those nonbank firms had to be done in a very ad hoc way."); accord
Karnitschnig, Solomon, Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath, supra note 224 (describing ten
days in which the Fed and Treasury saved Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on Sept. 6,
refused to bail out Lehman over the weekend of Sept.12-14, and then elected to save
AIG on Sept. 16).
227. Bernanke Q&A, supra note 226 ("Lehman was not allowed to fail that in the
sense there was some choice being made ... The Federal Reserve's ability to lend
which was used in the Bear Stearns case, for example, requires that adequate
collateral be posted so that we are not taking credit risk, we are lending against
collateral. In this case that was impossible. There simply wasn't enough collateral to
support the lending.").
228. See Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Senator Dodd, D-CT)
("[The Fed is required to act to] prevent a systemic collapse of financial markets.").
229. See, e.g., Bernanke Q&A, supra note 226 (describing how the financial system
had become organized such that many institutions had become "too big-to-fail.").
230. See supra notes 149-205 and accompanying text.
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continued to meet the "unusual" standard required under §
13(3).231 It seems clear that § 13(3) was a loophole provision
included in the Federal Reserve Act to help the Fed move swiftly
and decisively in response to significant threats; however, it is
unlikely that it was meant to form the basis of Fed action over a
232long horizon. At some point, continuing circumstances cease to
be unusual.233 At what point?
This is precisely the type of statutory construction question
the judiciary often resolves, yet the courts are admittedly ill suited
to decide issues inextricably linked to monetary policy.23 Thus, it
will ultimately fall to the Congress to resolve this thorny issue by
crafting law that preserves the flexibility necessary for an effective
monetary policy without that flexibility becoming self-defeating in
times of crisis.235
THOMAS 0. PORTER, II
231. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006); see also supra notes 162-169 and accompanying notes
(analyzing the legal standard for "unusual and exigent circumstances").
232. See Fettig, supra note 9 (stating that the 1932 Amendment was meant to have
narrow applicability).
233. Panel I Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors) ("However since our lending authority is only
for emergencies, we will have to take this window back. We'll have to close it when
conditions are normalized.").
234. See Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 34 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir.
1929).
235. See supra notes 207-234 and accompanying text.
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